Antitrust
MiCamp Solutions LLC v. Visa Inc.
Date: Dec. 11, 2025
Issue: Whether Visa violated the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 by monopolizing the card payment services market.
Case Summary: Judge Haywood Gilliam of the Northern District of California dismissed a lawsuit alleging that Visa violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by monopolizing the card payment services market.
As background, the Sherman Antitrust Act outlaws monopolistic business practices by banning contracts, conspiracies, and combinations that restrain trade and by prohibiting attempts to monopolize markets to protect fair competition. The Act authorizes the government to sue businesses that engage in anticompetitive conduct.
In December 2023, MiCamp Solutions LLC (MiCamp) sued Visa, alleging it engaged in anticompetitive conduct. Judge Gilliam dismissed MiCamp’s claims that same month, determining the complaint contained “muddled” antitrust allegations and “elementary mistakes.” In March 2024, MiCamp filed a first amended class action complaint, but the court again dismissed all claims, ruling the Sherman Act claims were barred by the Illinois Brick doctrine, a federal antitrust rule from the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois that limits damages actions to direct purchasers. As the court explained, MiCamp described itself as a “middleman” and did not directly pay the allegedly anticompetitive fines and fees imposed by Visa.
In April 2024, MiCamp filed a second amended complaint. Visa again moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint lacks facts showing antitrust standing under Illinois Brick and that MiCamp still failed to adequately plead the elements of its Sherman Act and state-law claims. The court dismissed the case for the third time, concluding MiCamp lacks antitrust standing because it failed to plausibly allege an antitrust injury under the Sherman Act. Citing Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters, the court explained that antitrust standing differs from Article III standing, so a plaintiff may suffer an injury in fact but still lack standing to bring a private antitrust claim.
Under the Associated General Contractors (AGC) framework, courts consider whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury is the type antitrust laws were meant to prevent, how direct the injury is, whether the harm is speculative, the risk of duplicative recovery, and the difficulty of apportioning damages. Applying these factors, the court held that MiCamp’s alleged injuries, including lost goodwill, pricing restrictions, reduced consumer choice, and financial harm from Non-Compliance Assessment (NCA) penalties, were conclusory, speculative, and untethered to any harm to competition in the relevant market. Because MiCamp did not show that its injuries flowed from anticompetitive effects, the court dismissed all Sherman Act claims for lack of antitrust standing.
The court also concluded that MiCamp failed to state a claim under state antitrust law. The court found that MiCamp’s Arizona and California claims failed for the same reasons as its federal claims because MiCamp did not plausibly allege harm to competition in the card payment processing services market. Under Arizona law, MiCamp did not explain how Visa’s conduct excluded competitors or controlled prices, and Arizona courts apply federal Sherman Act standards, which require a showing of causal antitrust injury. Likewise, the court dismissed MiCamp’s California Cartwright Act and Unfair Competition Law (UCL) claims because MiCamp did not plausibly allege any unlawful agreement or anticompetitive conduct, and its UCL claim depended entirely on the failed antitrust theories.
Bottom Line: The court stressed that MiCamp’s counsel must present allegations that are well-grounded in fact. Instead, the court found that MiCamp made its complaint harder to follow and removed key factual allegations. Because of this gamesmanship, the court dismissed the case without further leave to amend.
Document: Order
