By Heather Trew
The Trump administration is bringing a whole-of-government response to fight the deadly threat of illicit fentanyl. An April 2025 White House analysis estimates that in 2023 alone, illicit opioids — primarily fentanyl — cost Americans an estimated $2.7 trillion, or 9.7 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product.[i] According to the Drug Enforcement Agency, fentanyl and other synthetic drugs are the primary drivers of fatal drug overdose deaths nationwide.[ii]
In February, the administration designated eight international cartels as both Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs),[iii] citing their ongoing campaigns of violence and supply of deadly drugs throughout the Western Hemisphere.[iv] These transnational criminal organizations were identified as threats to both law enforcement and national security. On July 16, President Trump officially signed the HALT Fentanyl Act into law — permanently classifying fentanyl-related substances as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act.[v]
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has exercised a significant new authority to the fight against illicit fentanyl. On June 25, FinCEN issued three orders identifying three Mexico-based financial institutions as primary money laundering concerns in connection with illicit opioid trafficking:
- CIBanco S.A., Institutión de Banca Multiple (CIBanco);
- Intercam Banco S.A., Institución de Banca Multiple (Intercam); and
- Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. (Vector).
Under Section 2313a of the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, once the Treasury Secretary makes the finding that reasonable grounds exist for reaching this conclusion, with respect to the identified FIs operating outside the United States, the Secretary is authorized to prohibit the sending and receiving of funds (including convertible virtual currency) from those FIs. Originally, the orders were scheduled to go into effect on July 21, but on July 9, FinCEN extended the effective date of the orders to Sept. 4, 2025.[vi] FinCEN issued updated FAQs on July 9 to help covered FIs — which include banks — understand and comply with these upcoming prohibitions. FinCEN on Aug. 19 then extended the deadline to Oct. 20, 2025.
Section 2313a explained: Treasury’s latest weapon against illicit opioid financing
Section 2313a is a new authority passed by Congress, designed to help safeguard the U.S. financial system from the specific threat posed by money laundering in connection with illicit opioid trafficking outside the United States. While it shares similarities with the existing special measure authorities that FinCEN administers, such as section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act and section 9714 of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, it introduces a distinct legal framework tailored to the opioid crisis. Unlike section 311, it allows the Secretary to prohibit funds transmittals (or place conditions upon them), and unlike section 9714, it first requires the Secretary to determine that an FI operating outside the United States is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking.
Although this authority differs from the sanctions programs administered by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), it shares one key similarity: it requires covered FIs not to engage in prohibited transactions. However, unlike sanctions programs, these orders do not require that the funds associated with any prohibited transaction be blocked or reported to Treasury. In FAQ 11, FinCEN also notes that FinCEN regulatory actions are distinct from OFAC-administered sanctions, and should not be treated the same as OFAC actions.[vii] In other words, this authority is unique.
Oct. 20 compliance deadline: Cease fund transmittals to select Mexican FIs
FIs must cease any and all transmittals of funds, from or to CIBanco, Intercam, or Vector, as well as their Mexico-located branches, subsidiaries and offices[viii] by Oct. 20, 2025.
The orders define “transmittals of funds” as the sending and receiving of funds, including convertible virtual currency.[ix] Note that any branches, subsidiaries or offices of any of these three institutions located outside Mexico, including U.S. based locations (if any), are not covered by the prohibition. More specifically, FinCEN expects banks (and other covered FIs) to “exercise reasonable due diligence to prevent engaging in transmittals of funds involving CIBanco, Intercam, or Vector.”[x]
After Oct. 20: FinCEN’s expectations beyond prohibited financial transactions
FinCEN also expects covered FIs to “consider the finding of primary money laundering concern regarding CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector when complying with their other Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) obligations, including…to establish and maintain anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) compliance programs.”[xi] FinCEN also expects covered FIs to “implement procedures to ensure compliance with the terms of the orders.”[xii] The FAQs provide additional guidance and context, but there are no express regulator statements about specific ways banks should consider the findings of primary money laundering concern with respect to their risk-based AML/CFT programs.
FinCEN’s additional recommendations for covered FIs
FinCEN recommends that covered FIs:
- Use their traditional compliance screening “to identify customers and determine their involvement in a transmittal of funds involving CIBanco, Intercam, or Vector”;[xiii] and
- Ensure they are “providing appropriate oversight and support to the activities of their foreign subsidiaries and affiliates” (if any), “particularly with respect to identifying and mitigating the illicit finance risks” associated with the transmittal of funds involving CIBanco, Intercam, or Vector.[xiv]
In addition, although the orders expressly do not impose new suspicious activity report (SAR) reporting obligations (or alter existing ones), covered FIs “may consider, as warranted and appropriate” these findings that CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector are identified as being of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking.[xv]
Key clarifications on scope, timing and responsibilities
- “Are FIs required to conduct a lookback or reject pre–Oct. 20 transactions involving CIBanco, Intercam, or Vector?”
FinCEN has stated that covered FIs are “only responsible for applying the orders to transactions that occur after the orders are effective.”[xvi] Decisions to conduct lookbacks are therefore not required under the orders; however, a bank may voluntarily wish look at historical transactions or relationships with these identified FIs as a way of evaluating — or reevaluating — risk.
- Do the orders prohibit any actions that are not “transmittals” defined by the orders after Oct. 20?
FinCEN also draws a distinction between custodying or safekeeping arrangements and the “transmittals” prohibited by the orders: “[i]f a covered [FI] holds financial securities that are held in custody or under safekeeping arrangements, it may not engage in any transmittal of funds related to those securities if such transmittal of funds involves CIBanco, Intercam or Vector.”[xvii]
- Are CIBanco, Intercam, or Vector included on OFAC’s sanctions lists?
No — not as a result of this action. This action is separate from sanctions designations by OFAC, so these institutions would not have been added to any OFAC sanctions lists as a result of these FinCEN-issued orders.[xviii] Note however, that this FinCEN guidance may not determine how a bank’s core provider (or other third-party service) may choose to address and incorporate these upcoming prohibitions into their products and services. Since these three Mexico-based FIs are not part of OFAC’s sanctions list screening as a result of this action, banks should communicate with their core and other sanctions and BSA-related service providers to understand their offerings and to help determine whether it is advisable or necessary to take any specific individual action to comply with these orders and avoid prohibited transactions.
Are there new SAR obligations tied to these orders, or any new red flags?
No new SAR obligations have been imposed by the Section 2313a orders themselves, and existing BSA requirements remain unchanged. However, FinCEN has separately provided important context and guidance that may help inform a bank’s monitoring and reporting practices related to fentanyl.
In April 2025, FinCEN published a comprehensive financial trend analysis[xix] based on information that banks and other FIs reported in response to FinCEN’s 2019[xx] and 2024[xxi] fentanyl advisories. FinCEN analyzed 1,246 BSA reports that identified suspected fentanyl-related activity between January and December 2024, and identified approximately $1.4 billion in suspicious transactions.
According to the FTA, FIs reported the following:
Geographic references: Common locations cited identified: Sinaloa, Jalisco, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Hebei as well as key “plazas” in Baja, Sonora and Chihuahua.
Generic payment terms: Reported transactions often included generic payment instructions like “goods” and “services.”
- Concentration of activity: A notable pattern in some SARs included a single PRC-based chemical supplier receiving multiple bank wire transfers.
- Precursor identifiers: BSA reports referred to seven identified Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers associated with fentanyl precursors in open-source advertisements.
- Code words: Transactions included slang such as
“blues,” “ills,” “lows,” “shoes,” “dirty,” “dirty 30s,” and blue dot emojis.
- Payment mechanisms:
- Electronic funds transfers, referenced in 80 percent of the BSA reports, as the most common payment mechanism in fentanyl-related BSA reporting
- Cash (54%)
- Person-to-Person (P2P) payments (51%)
- Convertible virtual currency (10%)
Note that although these Section 2313a orders do not impose new SAR filing obligations, or alter existing ones, FinCEN notes that “[i]f a SAR is filed on CIBanco, Intercam, or Vector’s transactional activity” FinCEN requests the SAR include the appropriate identifier in Field 2 (“Filing Institution Note to FinCEN”)[xxii]:
- “CIBanco2313a FIN-2025″
- “Intercam2313a FIN-2025”
- “Vector2313a FIN-2025”
This voluntary notation helps FinCEN better track any reported activity that may be related to its June 2025 orders under Section 2313a.
For more information, ABA’s staff analysis can be found at: aba.com/advocacy/policy-analysis/FinCEN-2313a-Update.
This article appeared in the September-October edition of ABA Risk and Compliance Magazine.
Heather Trew serves as SVP and counsel for Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering and sanctions at ABA. Before joining ABA, she held key leadership roles at Treasury, including as assistant general counsel for enforcement and intelligence, where she served as the senior career lawyer and head of legal for the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, as well as stints as the acting chief counsel for TFI’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. She also served as counselor to the Treasury general counsel, specializing in virtual assets. She also spent eight years at the Department of Justice in the National Security Division, where she served as a deputy unit chief and focused extensively on national security matters. Prior to her government service, she practiced law as an associate at Jenner & Block and Foley & Lardner. Heather holds a J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School and an A.B. from Stanford University. She can be reached at [email protected].
[i] The Staggering Cost of the Illicit Opioid Epidemic in the United States – The White House
[ii] 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment
[iii] Designation of International Cartels – United States Department of State
[iv] 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment at 6.
[v] President Trump Signs HALT Fentanyl Act into Law – The White House
[vi] https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Final-FAQs.pdf, FAQ 8.
[vii] FinCEN FAQs Update to Section 2313a Orders Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector at FAQ 11.
[viii] FAQs 8, 12.
[ix] FAQ 12.
[x] FAQs at 1.
[xi] FAQ 8.
[xii] FAQs at 1.
[xiii] FAQ 18.
[xiv] FAQ 17.
[xv] FAQ 15.
[xvi] FAQ 14.
[xvii] FAQ 18.
[xviii] FAQ 11.
[xix] https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCEN-FTA-Fentanyl.pdf
[xx] In 2019 FinCEN issued a fentanyl advisory that alerted banks to two types of fentanyl trafficking: direct buys of fentanyl from China, and cross border trafficking of fentanyl from Mexico by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and smaller criminal networks. FinCEN Advisory FIN-2019-A006, August 21, 2019
[xxi] In 2024, FinCEN issued a supplemental advisory on the procurement of precursor chemicals, those used to synthesize and manufacture illicit fentanyl https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories/fincen-advisory-fin-2024-a002
[xxii] FAQ 15.
