Telephone Consumer Protection Act
McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates Inc. v. McKesson Corp.
Date: June 20, 2025
Issue: Whether federal district courts must adhere to a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) finding that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) does not prohibit “junk faxes” that are received only via online fax services.
Case Summary: In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to a federal agency’s interpretation of the statute.
The Hobbs Act allows parties to seek pre-enforcement review within 60 days of an interpretive FCC order. The Hobbs Act provides that the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or determine the validity of all final orders of the FCC.
The TCPA creates a private right of action against companies that “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement.” McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates brought a class action lawsuit against McKesson Corporation, alleging it sent unsolicited messages using online fax services to market its medical software products. While the lawsuit was ongoing, the FCC issued an order determining the TCPA did not apply to an online fax service because it was not a “telephone facsimile machine.” The district court followed the interpretation in the FCC’s order and entered summary judgment for McKesson, reasoning the Hobbs Act precluded the court from considering whether the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA was correct. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
In McLaughlin’s certiorari petition, it pointed out the Court previously granted certiorari to resolve a similar issue in PDR Network LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc. In PDR Network, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Hobbs Act requires district courts to accept the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA in private lawsuits. ABA filed an amicus brief in PDR Network LLC, urging the Court to follow the FCC’s interpretations because it would give banks greater certainty that a decision from a single federal district court will not upend their nationwide compliance programs.
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, ruling the Hobbs Act does not prevent district courts from considering challenges to the FCC’s statutory interpretations. The Court explained that pre-enforcement review statutes fall into three categories: those that bar judicial review during enforcement, those that allow or anticipate review both before and during enforcement, and those — like the Hobbs Act — that remain silent on review during enforcement. For this third category, the Court held that basic administrative law principles require district courts to independently interpret the statute in enforcement proceedings, rather than defer to the agency’s view. Citing its recent Loper Bright decision, the Court emphasized the Administrative Procedure Act codifies this rule by allowing judicial review of agency action during enforcement unless an earlier, adequate, and exclusive review process already existed.
In dissent, Justice Elena Kagan concluded the majority’s opinion was wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation. Justice Kagan noted that the text of the Hobbs Act makes clear that litigants who have declined to seek pre-enforcement judicial review may not contest the statutory validity of agency action in later district court enforcement proceedings.
Bottom Line: District courts must independently determine the Hobbs Act’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.
Documents: Opinion
