Chevron Deference
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
Date: June 28, 2024
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court should overrule Chevron deference.
Case Summary: In a landmark 6-3 decision written by Justice John Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Chevron deference, holding that courts may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.
The Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., established a foundational doctrine where courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of acts of Congress. Chevron set forth a two-step analysis. First, a court must ascertain “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If it has, then that is the end of the inquiry, and the court must follow Congress’s intent. Second, if the court finds the text of the statute silent or ambiguous as to the specific issue at hand, the court must defer to a reasonable agency interpretation.
In Loper Bright v. Raimondo and Relentless v. Department of Commerce, fishing industry plaintiffs challenged a 2018 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) rule requiring fishers to pay part of the cost of having federal compliance monitors on their ships. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that NMFS misinterpreted the Magnuson-Stevens Fisher Conservation Management Act and created regulations exceeding the agency’s authority, causing the lower courts to dismiss. Applying Chevron deference, the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the dismissal in Loper Bright, and the First Circuit upheld the dismissal in Relentless.
The Supreme Court reversed and overruled Chevron. The Court ruled Chevron deference cannot be squared with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and with courts’ paramount duty to interpret the laws that Congress enacts. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied on the language of the APA, which assigns to federal courts the authority to “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” The APA, the Court concluded, “codifies for agency cases the unremarkable, yet elemental proposition reflected by judicial practice dating back to Marbury: that courts decide legal questions by applying their own judgment.” The majority also relied on pre-New Deal decisions stressing that agency determinations are entitled to respect but not blind allegiance.
The Court also maintained the APA requires a court to exercise its independent judgment to decide all relevant questions of law and interpret statutory provisions. The Court explained Chevron insisted on more than the “respect” historically given to Executive Branch interpretations. Rather, Chevron demanded courts mechanically afford binding deference to agency interpretation, including those that have been inconsistent over time. The Court emphasized the “regime is the antithesis of the time-honored approach the APA prescribes.” Moreover, the Court concluded that “Chevron’s presumption is misguided because agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities. Courts do.” Going forward, the Court explained, the federal courts must play a more active role in reviewing statutes by “using every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity.”
The Court also rejected the government’s argument that Congress must generally intend for agencies to resolve statutory ambiguities. The Government argued agencies have subject matter expertise regarding the statutes they administer, and deferring to agencies purportedly promotes the uniform construction of federal law. But the Court emphasized these arguments do not justify Chevron’s sweeping presumption of congressional intent. The Court explained interpretive issues arising in connection with a regulatory scheme “may fall more naturally into a judge’s bailiwick than an agency’s.”
The Court also recognized that Congress may expressly delegate certain authority to an administrative agency, and it explained that courts should respect that delegation so long as Congress’s intent is sufficiently clear. As the Court explained, “when the best reading of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits.” The problem with Chevron, the Court explained, is that it presumed that any statutory ambiguity is an implicit delegation of Congress’s authority to an administrative agency.
Finally, the Court determined “stare decisis does not require the Chevron project to persist.” The Court pointed out that stare decisis is not an “inexorable command.” Stare decisis considers the quality of the precedent’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, and reliance on the decision. In the Court’s view, each factor favored letting Chevron go because it has proved to be fundamentally misguided. The Court reiterated Chevron cannot be reconciled with the APA.
In concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas opined Chevron violates the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers. According to Justice Thomas, Chevron curbs the judicial power afforded to courts and simultaneously expands agencies’ power beyond constitutional limits. Justice Thomas noted Chevron compels judges to abdicate their Article III “judicial power.” In his view, Chevron deference prevents judges from exercising their independent judgment to resolve ambiguities.
In dissent, Justice Elena Kagan noted Chevron has served as a cornerstone of administrative law for 40 years, allocating responsibility for statutory construction between courts and agencies. According to Justice Kagan, courts use all normal interpretive tools to determine whether Congress has spoken to an issue when applying Chevron. Justice Kagan theorized the Supreme Court has “long understood Chevron deference to reflect what Congress would want and so to be rooted in a presumption of legislative intent.”
Bottom Line: The Court noted that its decision does not call into question its prior cases that relied on Chevron, which remain binding precedent. Those decisions, the Court stated, “are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology.”
Documents: Opinion
